

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 4 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom)

62-15136

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. ASSUMPÇÃO de ARAUJO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA
Mr. G.D. COMMAR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTIA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Mr. H. BLIX
Mrs. A. ROSSEL

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.H. SHAPTOCK
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the thirty-first meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ATTA (Nigeria): Before commenting briefly on some of the points which appear to us significant in the plan of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2) as well as in the plan of the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr.1) on general and complete disarmament now before us, I should like to congratulate their authors for their hard work not only in connexion with the preparation of the plans now under close examination here, but also for their untiring efforts to explain the most significant features of these plans to us. Those of us who have listened to the many speeches which have been made in the past few days in connexion with these plans and who have also given close attention to the plans realize only too well the complicated problem which their authors were trying to solve. Our passing remarks should not be taken as a sign of lack of understanding of the problems which faced them; rather it should be regarded as a sincere attempt to close the area of misunderstandings so as to reach an agreed goal.

The first point which occurs to my delegation is the difficulty of finding a common basis for comparing the two plans. For instance, in terms of time -- and time is an important element in any disarmament discussion -- stage I and stage II of the Soviet Union plan almost fit into or correspond with stage I of the United States plan. The differences in the concept of time are not a yardstick of the sincerity or insincerity of either of the plans, but it does make true comparison difficult if not impossible. Certainly, it has helped to widen the differences which in themselves are not so significant. Our primary task would be to agree on a timetable for each stage of disarmament and to relate to each stage what is practicable and feasible and what may be mutually acceptable. It is not the length of each stage which matters. What matters is whether each party to the treaty sincerely believes in general and complete disarmament from stage I to stage III, coherently, and has the will and the confidence to carry out disarmament measures from the first stage to the last stage. By all means, therefore, we should strive to reach a common basis for a timetable for each stage of disarmament, but the real issue is not the time limit as such but what we can achieve during the stages.

This argument takes me to what we have described in the past as confidence-generating measures. We have so far agreed in theory to the need for confidence-building measures; in practice we did measure up to our ideas when we strove to

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discuss collateral measures. We have had few concrete proposals so far about how to build up confidence between the two parties. It has been suggested that when arms were actually being destroyed the parties to the treaty would gain automatic momentum in their enthusiasm to disarm completely. We have heard the other argument that any half measures of disarmament which carries with it strict control over armaments may in fact encourage the possibility of war. It is not my task to say which is right or wrong. However, my delegation believes that verification, confidence -- building measures and disarmament are one and the same thing. These three elements must rise or fall together. Total verification, total disarmament and total confidence-generating measures are one and the same. If therefore we accept a small measure of disarmament, in our opinion we must be prepared to accept a small measure of verification, and mutual confidence. It is left to us to choose what we may in the course of this Conference.

In referring to the two plans now before us, I should like to suggest that both the United States and the Soviet Union give further thought to those parts of their plans which relate to military expenditure. Under the Soviet plan it is not until stage III that appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form would be discontinued. In stages II and III military expenditure would be reduced in proportion to first and second stage reductions in arms and armed forces. This proportion does not help us very much in the sense that we do not know whether reduction of expenditure is related to recurrent cost or capital cost. If it is related to both, then it is possible that the sum total of military expenditure in any given year may be greater than the value of the arms reduction: for example, in effecting the 100 per cent reduction in stage I of the Soviet plan. Equally difficult to understand is the United States proposal in stage I which makes no concrete suggestion but refers to examination by the parties to the treaty of questions relating to the verifiable reductions of military expenditure.

The view of my delegation is that military expenditure should be reduced in stage I to a level which would just be sufficient to maintain the forces and the equipment retained at the end of stage I or at the beginning of stage II. Our reasons for holding this view are as follows: first, reduction in military expenditure will affect all disarmament measures, in particular production; second, reduction of military expenditure will bring immediate benefits to all the people of the country concerned and hence assist to build further confidence;

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third, reduction of military expenditure does not involve any elaborate system of verification. It is conceded here, however, that a different form of verification may be necessary in accordance with each different economic and political system. For example, a cut in the military expenditure in a democratic State implies an automatic cut in the production of war weapons in that State. This may not necessarily mean the same in a State in which all the means of production are owned by the State. However, it is the view of my delegation that the problem of control here is not insurmountable.

The other vital issue is that of the method of a cut in equipment and weapons. In considering a cut ranging from 100 per cent to 30 per cent for categories of weapons or types within each category, we have so far assumed a certain uniformity of cut either within the category or within types in a category of weapons. In the view of my delegation we must explore the possibility of changing these rigid formulae for more flexible ones which would help to give balance and purpose to our measures. This means that we must be prepared to use different formulae for each type within a category of weapon if that will help the solution of our problem. For instance, we must be prepared to use the method of quantitative cuts or variable percentage cuts within types in a category of weapon. This means that, in practice, if we are convinced, for instance, that nuclear delivery vehicles pose the most urgent question we could, if we wanted to, reduce the existing vehicles by, say, 50 or 60 per cent and not necessarily by 30 or 100 per cent. Similarly we may decide to reduce all available nuclear weapons carrying aircraft, say, to 200 instead of reducing on a percentage basis. The real point here is that we would be adhering to a method which was flexible and not rigid and which would thus enable us to maintain balance at each stage of disarmament.

So far I have referred only to the need of utilizing budgetary control as a means of generating confidence towards disarmament and of effecting disarmament, and also of introducing further flexibility into our method of approach. Speaking generally on the plan of the Soviet Union and that of the United States, it would appear that despite some occasional agreement on a broad basis there must be give-and-take before we can hope to make any further progress. What we have before us are plans designed to suit each national strategy for the purpose of maintaining military superiority over the other at each stage of disarmament. It

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is the task of this Conference to seek to maintain a proper balance through impartial deliberation.

In the view of my delegation, the United States should give further thought to its plan, taking into account the following possibilities: first, the removal of the threat of nuclear war before stage III is reached. Secondly, the transition from one stage to the other must be removed from national politics. The threat of nuclear war should not hang over our heads for the next nine years, especially since the destructive power of such a war would remain largely undiminished.

The disarmament measures in respect of nuclear war proposed for stages I and II are just sufficient to prevent us from flogging the dead horse; they do not, in my opinion, prevent us from killing the horse. If we removed the threat of conventional war to a degree which would make it impossible for one side to overrun the other, within a short period of time we should be able with confidence to destroy all nuclear weapons and means of delivery before stage III was reached. The real deterrent will not be the nuclear weapons or their means of delivery: it will be the realization that, with the existing know-how and industrial potentials of the two sides, a large scale conventional war over a period of time will ultimately result in a nuclear war, even if all existing stockpiles are destroyed.

It is my humble opinion, in connexion with the second point, that once the treaty is signed all the obligations contained in it must be accepted as a whole. If we permit each party to the treaty to determine at each stage whether or not it wishes to continue with the second stage, I submit that national political forces will hamper our efforts towards general and complete disarmament. Disarmament measures must be made difficult for each country to break with impunity, and indeed to succeed they must have the force of constitutional laws since non-compliance with these measures would affect the basis of national security.

The plan of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, suffers from over-compression. There are also obvious weaknesses relating to measures of inspection of armaments. National disarmament is simple, but all international disarmament measures require careful preparation because there are external super-impositions. A period of four years for complete disarmament would have to be considered in the light of the

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problems which we have not yet resolved and of the magnitude of which we are not fully aware.

With regard to verification and control, I revert to my previous contention that verification, disarmament and confidence are one and the same thing. The less we had of one the less we should have of the others. In this regard I will support the view that 100 per cent reduction involves 100 per cent inspection. The problem, as I see it, is that if we decide to have a 100 per cent cut in respect of our most lethal weapons, we should have not only 100 per cent inspection of the weapons which are being cut, but 100 per cent inspection of other less lethal weapons. This must be so if we ever hope to achieve the necessary balance.

Again, suppose we decide to have a 30 per cent cut of certain arms. How do we determine 30 per cent inspection measures? We are told that inspection should relate only to the arms being destroyed or on the production line. If we destroy a very small percentage of arms, say 5 per cent each year, I am prepared to accept the argument that there will be no point in verifying what remains. As soon as we begin to destroy a significant percentage, however, what remains becomes very important. In my opinion, a 30 to 40 per cent cut is such a significant figure. Whether or not we should agree to the non-inspection of the remaining arms until we reach a significant cut is a matter to be discussed.

The real point I am getting at is that we must give further close study to the proposal for zonal inspection, or similar proposals which would enable us to carry out verification of armaments at a significant level. In the opinion of my delegation there is a need to study further the proposal for zonal inspection in relation to the organization, composition and functions of the international disarmament organization. The more it is a game of chance the more confidence it will generate. What matters, however, is that the powers of an inspection body should be obligatory but not necessarily selective.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): In considering the basic elements which may help this Committee to compare the merits of the proposals we have in front of us, my delegation would like to draw the attention of our colleagues to a factor which we consider very important, namely, the factor of security -- the security of all our nations and of the whole world, which is one of the main objectives of general and complete disarmament. It is, therefore, correct and

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necessary to consider all proposals and plans from the point of view of how effective, quick, and realistic they are in their capacity to attain this objective. Here, the first stage of general and complete disarmament must already be such as to lead to substantial results on the road towards security. Otherwise justified doubts may arise as to the correctness of methods, means, and concrete measures for the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

It seems that all members of this Committee agree that one of the first measures of general and complete disarmament should be a substantial reduction of the danger of a nuclear war. This would constitute great progress towards the safeguarding of security of all nations and of all humanity.

How do the two drafts we have before us -- the draft treaty of the Soviet Union and the United States outline of basic provisions of the treaty -- correspond to this basic criterion? One of the principal elements, if not the main one, of the growing danger of a surprise attack and of a nuclear war in our time is the huge potential of nuclear weapons together with all delivery vehicles of all types. There is a consensus that immobilisation and neutralisation of this enormous power through the elimination of delivery vehicles of all types would constitute the first effective step towards the reduction of this danger.

We are concerned with the extent of such an operation in the first stage. It should be recalled that the potential of nuclear weapons -- as has been mentioned here and as is mentioned nearly every day in the Press -- is sufficient to exterminate a larger number of people than the present world population. Estimates relating only to the United States, and published from time to time in the Press -- reappearing this week, for instance, in Newsweek -- mention the terrible destructive capacity of these weapons: three billion people. If we take into account the existing stockpiles in other countries, we are confronted with the formidable fact that existing nuclear weapons are capable of killing perhaps twice or three times as many people as are alive at the present time. In view of this fact it is clear at first sight that this danger hanging over mankind will not become smaller if the number of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles is reduced by 10, 20, 30 or even 50 per cent. The nature of the danger is such that no old methods will do to eliminate it. The conservative tactics sometimes called "salami tactics" are not capable of doing it.

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In this connexion, permit me to remind my colleagues of an old saying that it is rather strange to attempt to kill a dangerous snake by starting to cut its tail. I think this saying is rather common in the language of nearly all our countries. I think that is precisely what the United States proposal is trying to do. This enormous danger cannot be curbed by timid partial measures. It must be approached with a decisive and bold step which will deal a blow to its substance, and this is precisely what is envisaged by the Soviet draft. On the contrary, the implementation of measures proposed in the first stage of the United States outline would be practically meaningless from the point of view of ensuring, or at least strengthening, the security of our peoples and of the world. Linked with the control measures for which the United States is pressing, security would be even more threatened and the danger of a nuclear war could only be increased.

The implementation of the measures envisaged in the Soviet draft, both disarmament and control measures, would lead to a strengthening of confidence in the relations between States and to the easing of international tension. The total liquidation of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles would make it possible to introduce strict and comprehensive control in this field, thus ensuring that all States would honour the obligations undertaken by them. On the other hand, since nuclear weapons would be practically neutralized and immobilized, and the possibility of launching a surprise attack eliminated, such comprehensive control would not entail any danger. The very data on the dislocation of various important installations which might be targets of a surprise nuclear attack would lose their importance.

On the contrary, a 30 per cent reduction -- or any other partial reduction -- would face this Conference with a practically insoluble problem of control. At our meeting yesterday the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, tried to prove that, while total liquidation of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles would meet with grave difficulties as regards control, a 30 per cent reduction would not cause such problems. We are not persuaded by his arguments. The objections or difficulties which he adduced in connexion with the total liquidation of delivery vehicles apply fully, and even more, to partial liquidation. A partial reduction in the levels of delivery vehicles would even invite those States which would wish to evade the fulfilment of their undertakings to circumvent them.

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Serious facts of a political nature add to this argument. The continued existence of a large number of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and untouched stockpiles of nuclear weapons would, as I pointed out earlier, lead to no elimination of the danger of a nuclear attack. In such a situation any control would objectively serve the acquiring of intelligence information of exceptional value. Thus a potential aggressor would find himself in ideal conditions. The remaining delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons could be used for launching a destructive attack with an exact knowledge of the principal targets which the aggressor would like to destroy.

It follows that the adoption of the procedure proposed in the United States outline not only would not lead to the strengthening of confidence among States, and thus to a relaxation of international tensions and a reduction of the danger of a nuclear war, but, in view of the disproportion between the scope of disarmament and control measures, would necessarily lead to just the opposite result.

From the point of view of averting the danger of a nuclear war, considerable importance attaches to the measures to carry out the individual stages of disarmament and their speed -- that is, how quickly the process of general and complete disarmament would advance. Further, this criterion fully confirms the advantages of a proposal which would ensure -- as early as in the first stage, which would be completed within the short period of fifteen months -- the implementation of such measures as would practically eliminate the danger of war, as is the case with the Soviet draft.

On the contrary, the United States outline does not contemplate the elimination of this danger even in the third stage -- the completion of which, by the way, is shifted to an indefinite but in any case far-distant future. The authors of the outline are evidently aware of this. It is expressively attested to by the fact that, as late as in the third stage, part F, the outline envisages the necessity of carrying out additional measures for the reduction of the danger of war. This is conditioned by the provision that as late as in the third stage there would be still in existence both nuclear weapons -- the production of which in the terms of the United States outline, would continue even in stage II -- and the means for their delivery.

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The representative of the United States and those who support his proposal assert that complete liquidation of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in the course of stage I is unrealistic. In their view a 30 per cent reduction is realistic, however. Here the question rightly arises, from what does their view in this regard proceed? Why do they believe that a certain percentage reduction is more realistic than total liquidation? May the technical feasibility of implementing disarmament measures perhaps depend on their scope? We see no arguments that would prove that a 30 per cent reduction, or any other partial reduction, would be more feasible than total liquidation of nuclear weapon vehicles. On the contrary, long experience of disarmament negotiations proves that all attempts that have been made so far to adopt partial, and not complete, disarmament measures have failed because of insurmountable obstacles.

Numerous facts indicate that the total liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles could be accomplished better and controlled more reliably than any other measure. The nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in fact form a very special type of armaments which are serviced by a relatively small number of highly qualified personnel. Their production is highly specialized and demands high technical skill, and it would therefore be most improbable that any attempt to circumvent the respective provisions would escape control and inspection. Finally, compared with other types of weapons, this is a relatively small category of weapons, so that from the standpoint of physical liquidation the scale of measures to be taken would be relatively smaller than, for instance, those that we witnessed in the case of the demobilization of armies after the Second World War.

As we see it, what is decisive in the question of the liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is not the criterion of technical feasibility but first and foremost the criterion of readiness to agree to adopt and implement consistent and effective disarmament measures which would in the first stage bring effective results.

Another criterion which must be respected in weighing the merits of the implementation of individual measures for averting the danger of a nuclear war and strengthening the security of all States is the criterion that as a result of certain measures no State should gain unilateral advantages.

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The Soviet draft is fully balanced from this point of view also; it would ensure security for all States in equal measure. The Western Powers object that the liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage -- and, as a consequence, the neutralization of nuclear weapons themselves -- would place them in a disadvantageous position in view of the alleged superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional armed forces and armaments. In our view, this objection has no justification. The measures envisaged in the first stage of the Soviet draft are, as we know, not limited to the total liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles but contain other measures, in particular a substantial reduction of the levels of conventional armed forces and their armaments.

Taking into account that the levels of armed forces would be cut to 1.7 million men for both the Soviet Union and the United States and that their conventional armaments would be reduced in a corresponding manner, how can one speak of any superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional armed forces and their armaments?

Equal security for all participating States is also ensured in the proposal that, along with the liquidation of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and a substantial reduction of levels of conventional armed forces and their armaments, all foreign bases on the territories of other States should also be liquidated, and all foreign troops should be withdrawn from foreign territories.

This proposal is based on the fact that foreign military bases on the territories of other States cannot by any means contribute to better security and to the averting of the danger of war. This follows directly from their nature and from the role they play in the strategic plans of individual countries. In one of its previous statements, my delegation pointed to the aspects which give these bases a specific position and a different character from domestic bases -- precisely from the standpoint of the danger of war. The representatives of the Western Powers were unable to adduce a single argument that could refute these facts. They persist, however, in maintaining that foreign bases do not form a specific category and do not deserve special measures for averting the danger of war. If no other arguments can persuade our colleagues who do not see this difference, perhaps we may take into consideration the opinion of some of the people who are directly concerned with the problem of foreign bases on their territories from the standpoint of a potential danger of war. For instance, let

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us ask the people of Tunisia about Bizerta, the Japanese people about Okinawa, or the people of Cuba about Guantanamo, in order to understand what foreign bases mean in connexion with the danger of war and the threat to security.

All these facts demonstrate clearly that the effect of measures proposed in the United States outline, both in the first and in the subsequent stages, is at least very doubtful as regards the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the safeguarding and strengthening of the security of all States. Evidently this is realized also by the authors of the outline, who try to correct the inadequacies in this respect in the United States draft by adding measures which have not much in common with general and complete disarmament itself. This is how we may interpret the emphasis placed in the United States draft on the establishment of the so-called peace force, which in the third stage of general and complete disarmament would be so strong that it could not be repelled by any country. Such a concept of the safeguarding of peace is in actual fact a negation of disarmament and is inconsistent with the legal norms regulating mutual relations between States and with the principles which constitute the basis of the United Nations and its apparatus for the safeguarding of international peace and security.

What is necessary first and foremost is that real and effective measures of disarmament should be undertaken in the first stage: and such is the total immobilization of nuclear weapons with a view to their early destruction. Then it would not be necessary to seek a remedy at the last moment in the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among the Heads of Government or of State, as proposed in the United States draft. Naturally, we do not oppose the idea of direct contacts between Heads of State and of the technical facilities necessary to this end; we only think it is a little strange to regard it as a substantial disarmament measure. It reminds one of the technique of fiction and film thrillers, where peace is saved at the last moment by a Saviour-like telephone call between statesmen. We have to be serious, and the main thing is not to allow such a situation to arise. This is provided for as early as in the first stage of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

A comparison of the two drafts for the first stage shows that from the standpoint of averting the danger of a nuclear war and safeguarding equal security for all States the Soviet draft provides full guarantees for the security not only of

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the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries but of all other countries as well.

On the contrary, it seems to my delegation that the draft of the United States leads to quite different conclusions. A detailed examination of this outline indicates that its authors were guided by the view maintained by a number of prominent theoreticians, both in the United States and in other Western countries and, in fact, by the whole school of strategic thought -- namely, the view that disarmament should be interpreted as arms control and, as such, should be considered from the standpoint of providing unilateral military advantages. Such a basis, however, cannot help in accomplishing the tasks which have been assigned to the Conference. My delegation therefore believes that substantial re-thinking is necessary on the part of the United States and its allies if we are to reach an agreement on the first stage of disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): My delegation listened with great interest to the statement of the representative of Nigeria. He gave us a great deal of food for thought, and we shall study his statement with the greatest of care.

This morning I should like to continue the explanation of the measures in the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30 and Corr.1) by moving to those portions of the treaty outline concerning nuclear weapons. In the preparation of these measures we attempted to assess the existing trends in the development, production and proliferation of these weapons as carefully as possible. Of course, the primary objective has been to develop measures to reduce and eliminate the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. However, examination of today's nuclear weapons will convey a sense of the enormous complexity which pervades the field of modern military planning and weapon technology. Therefore, throughout our consideration this morning I would request members to keep the following three basic United States objectives in mind:

- (1) To halt the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- (2) To prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons during the disarmament process;
- (3) To eliminate the existing nuclear weapons stockpiles.

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It is significant that nuclear weapons are in fact the crucial index of destructive military capability, and as long as these weapons remain the threat of this destructive capability remains. Thus the task of this Conference is clear. We must seek and agree to carefully developed and balanced measures to eliminate the dangers posed by the nuclear weapons themselves.

The measures on which I shall comment can be found in the United States treaty outline, beginning with section C on page 8. In stage I there are the following six measures concerning nuclear weapons:

- (1) Halting the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons;
- (2) Transfer of fissionable material to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons;
- (3) Transfer of fissionable materials between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- (4) Non transfer of nuclear weapons;
- (5) Prohibition of nuclear weapon test explosions, if no prior agreement on this measure has been reached; -- which I sincerely hope will not be the case; and
- (6) Examination of the remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

In stage II, remaining stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissionable material would be reduced. The non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons reduced would be destroyed, and production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be limited.

In stage III, the parties to the treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, and would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses all plants for producing them.

Thus the United States programme contains a series of related measures focussed on our ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all States possessing such weapons. These measures affect all areas of the nuclear weapon field and they are arranged in a systematic, concentric pattern so as to contain, to reduce, and finally to eliminate the nuclear threat.

As I said at our fifteenth meeting on 4 April (ENDC/PV.15, page 39), measures of stage I of the United States programme are designed to put a complete and immediate stop

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to the spread of nuclear capability to nations not now possessing such capability. These measures would also ensure a complete stop to a further increase in stockpiles of nuclear weapons and an earlier reduction of these stockpiles. But, as Secretary of State Rusk pointed out in his statement on 27 March (ENDC/PV.10, page 7), we believe that while this is very important, it is not in itself enough. Mr. Rusk stated on that occasion that we must, as rapidly as scientific knowledge can point the way for us, seek to eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles, and he suggested that we mobilize the best scientific resources of our respective nations to concentrate upon this task.

It is for this purpose that our proposals in stage I provide that a committee of nuclear experts should be convened to develop feasible means for accomplishing the verified reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. I call attention to the fact that a similar provision was contained in the first stage of the Soviet plan of 23 September 1960 (A/4505). I further call attention to the fact that this provision does not appear in the Soviet draft treaty submitted to this Conference. We hope this does not mean that the Soviet Union now intends to insist on our concluding a treaty providing for the unconditional elimination of nuclear weapons before this study has been completed. On the other hand, if this omission is an indication that the Soviet Union has found an answer to this most difficult problem, we, and I am sure the other members of the Conference, should be very interested to hear it.

This merely illustrates another problem in connexion with trying to accomplish general and complete disarmament; that is, that one must be realistic in one's objectives and in the specific measures used; otherwise we shall revert to this search for a millennium, with no progress. In any event, as I stated on 4 April (ENDC/PV.15, page 42), the United States believes that this is a most urgent matter. I can also repeat what I said then, namely, that if the Soviet Union agrees that now, in advance of the negotiation of the full treaty on general and complete disarmament, we should establish such a committee within the framework of this Conference, we are quite prepared to consider it.

Those, then, are the proposals of the United States in the field of nuclear weapons. I believe it would be useful to examine them in greater detail by comparing them with the relevant proposals of the Soviet Union so as to define the areas where the two programmes are compatible and where the main differences between them lie.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

It appears that we are not too far apart on many of the key issues. For example, a measure to halt production of fissionable material can be found in stage II of the Soviet plan (ENDC/2, page 14). There is also a measure to transfer agreed amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes (*ibid.*). Thus the substance of our respective proposals on this point is the same. However, we believe that we cannot begin real nuclear disarmament too soon and that these measures are precisely those practical steps which can mark such a beginning. It is our firm belief that we should begin the disarmament process in all areas, affecting all types of armaments, rather than leaving some of them until later stages. We hope, therefore, that the Soviet Union will reconsider its present position delaying the beginning of nuclear disarmament until stage II and will agree to some degree of nuclear disarmament taking place during the very first stage of the disarmament process.

The texts of both the United States and the Soviet Union provide in stage I for prevention of the transfer to other States of control of nuclear weapons and information regarding their manufacture. Both documents propose the reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles, though neither treaty presents the exact procedure to be utilized in making such reduction. Nevertheless, as can be seen, there are encouraging indications that agreement in this field is possible -- I repeat, is possible. Perhaps this justifies some additional detailed comments which I will now make relating to the implementation of the United States programme. In doing so, I should like to trace through the sequence of steps, all of which are aimed at accomplishing a single goal: the complete elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

First, the production of fissionable materials, that is to say, U-235, U-233 and PU-239, for use in weapons will be cut off. This is a necessary step in preventing the further build-up of weapons stockpiles.

After the cut-off of production has been accomplished, an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235 from past production would be transferred to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. It will be recalled that, as an initial increment, the United States proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union each transfer to non-weapons purposes 50,000 kilogrammes of U-235. We have also indicated that if the Soviet Union regards this quantity as either insufficient or excessive we would be prepared to consider any specific proposal it may make. So far we have heard none. In fact, our outline of basic provisions provides for transfer of "an agreed quantity"

(Mr. Dean, United States)

of U-235 (ENDC/30, page 9, paragraph 2.a). I call attention to the words "an agreed quantity", which indicate that the United States has an open mind on this point. In this connexion I support wholeheartedly what the representative of the United Kingdom said on this subject in his eloquent statement the day before yesterday.

As the cut-off enters into effect, and even more as the nuclear stockpiles are reduced, it will become increasingly important to prevent diversions of fissionable materials for use in weapons from facilities utilizing such materials for peaceful purposes. One important element of this problem involves the control of all fissionable material transferred between countries for use in peaceful nuclear facilities. This is the intent of the United States proposal for establishing appropriate safeguards over such transfers. These safeguards could be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency because of the experience and the role of that Agency in safeguarding the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

In stage II the parties to the treaty would reduce nuclear weapons and stockpiles of fissionable materials for use in weapons, on the basis of agreed percentages, to minimum levels determined in the light of their stage I examination of the means of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapon stockpiles. I have already referred to the importance of such examination with regard to further measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Another element essential to the containment of the nuclear threat but not contingent on any of the above steps is the need for agreement to prohibit nuclear weapon testing, to which I have already referred. However, I do not think it necessary to go further into the status of this particular matter at this point.

The methods by which these measures to reduce the nuclear threat will be implemented are of the greatest importance. In order to put a complete and immediate stop to the spread of nuclear weapons production, the United States plan provides that at the outset the parties would submit to the international disarmament organization a declaration listing the name, location and production capability of every facility capable of producing and processing fissionable materials -- in other words, sufficient information to enable the international disarmament organization to control the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons and the solution of the related control problems are not as difficult as would appear on first reading.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

When I spoke previously to the Conference on this subject on 4 April (ENDC/PV.15, page 39), I pointed out that there were two general methods of securing a cut-off of production. The first would be to continue production at the current rate while ensuring through detailed inspection that all fissionable material was accounted for and was not converted to weapons use. It is apparent that this particular inspection operation would be complex and burdensome. The second alternative would be to provide for a complete and absolute shutdown of all facilities used specifically for the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Inspection would be greatly simplified in this shutdown method, since it would not be too difficult to determine that the facility was not in fact in operation. There are other measures which could facilitate the control of such production. For example, we consider that the limitation of the production of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes will immeasurably ease the control problems. However, it should be understood that this provision is not in any way intended to interfere with or restrict any nation's programmes for peaceful projects which require fissionable material.

The verification procedures as developed in our negotiations could be included in an appropriate annex to the treaty and could be expanded as required by the international disarmament organization. It is sufficient to note here that the international disarmament organization would require adequate information regarding production facilities in order to verify that production had in fact stopped at designated facilities.

It is also quite clear that there must be some assurance against possible clandestine production by a violator. In this connexion the United States has suggested one example of inspection arrangements which would avoid the necessity of opening up to inspection a country's entire territory -- something about which the Soviet Union has been very much concerned. I refer of course to the possibility of employing a system of progressive zonal inspection as indicated in the United States draft (ENDC/30, pages 13 and 14). So far the Soviet delegation has failed to make any substantive comment on this possible method of inspection; it has limited itself to what appear, to us at least, to be sweeping statements distorting the United States proposals with regard to control and discounting the approach of zonal inspection, without giving it very careful examination. Thus, for instance, in his statement of 24 April Mr. Zorin asserted that under the United States proposal:

"With the first steps in disarmament, at the very beginning of the first stage, everything is placed under control. ... Inspectors of the

(Mr. Dean, United States)

international control organization are to be entitled to search every corner of any country under the pretext of discovering 'clandestine' activities" (ENDC/PV.26, page 27)

Mr. Zorin went on to say that my remark --

"concerning the so-called zonal or sample inspection ... does not introduce anything new." (ibid, page 28)

I submit that these remarks reflect either a lack of understanding by the Soviet delegation of our proposals or a wilful distortion of those proposals. I think this becomes very clear if one reads the following provision in section G, paragraph 3.c of the United States treaty outline:

"Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the international disarmament organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations." (ENDC/30, page 13)

I believe it would be much more useful and productive for the work of our Conference if, instead of knocking down such new ideas, which we have tried to work out very carefully in a desire to meet the Soviet point of view, the Soviet delegation would study and comment on these ideas in a constructive and considerate manner. We would appreciate this very much. If there are flaws in the zonal inspection method we would like to hear about them, but we would like to hear something specific. In any event we would like to have at least an explanation from the Soviet delegation of how it believes the problem of clandestine activities would be dealt with under its own proposals, which, as at present formulated, do not appear to us to throw any light on Soviet thinking on this particular matter.

It will be recalled that on 15 March, at the second meeting of this Conference, Secretary of State Rusk offered a method by which weapons grade fissionable material could be transferred to peaceful purposes. I would like to repeat this offer by quoting Mr. Rusk's remarks:

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"The United States has proposed that early in the first stage further production of any fissionable material for nuclear weapons use be stopped. We propose now that thereafter the United States and the USSR each agree to transfer in the first stage 50,000 kilogrammes of weapons grade U-235 to non-weapons purposes. Such a move would cut at the heart of nuclear weapons production. The initial transfers should be followed by additional transfers in the subsequent stages of the disarmament programme. Resources now devoted to military programmes could then be employed for purposes of peace." (ENDC/PV.2, page 21)

This offer, I emphasize, is still open. This is the third time it has been presented formally to our Soviet colleagues, but to date we have had no response. If the quantities of fissionable material involved are causing the delay, I would appreciate an indication. As I have already stated earlier in my remarks, we are ready, willing and able to discuss this offer in terms of higher or lower quantities in order to facilitate the implementation of this measure to cut off the production of fissionable material.

As regards the non-transfer of nuclear weapons, I have already indicated that both the United States and the Soviet proposals provide, in their first stages, for preventive action in that area. I believe that all of us here have a common interest in preventing, on a world-wide basis, the spread of these weapons. Together with the other measures we have proposed to contain the nuclear threat in the first stage of our programme, we believe this measure would be a valuable contribution to the achievement of our objective of first freezing, and then gradually reducing, nuclear armaments until they are completely eliminated from the arsenals of all States.

As I indicated earlier, the position of the United States and of the Soviet Union on the test ban question are well known. However, there should not be any misunderstanding caused by the inclusion in this group of measures of the provision for a controlled nuclear test ban. We would prefer that the negotiations for agreement result in a separate agreement because, in the absence of a clear indication of an early agreement on general and complete disarmament which will include a nuclear test ban, a separate agreement would seem to be the shortest and most efficient route to the test ban. A nuclear test ban may still be the earliest practical action that this Conference can take to inhibit the proliferation to other countries of a nuclear

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weapons production capability, and to provide working experience with an international control system. The urgency in this matter is well established, and as far as the United States is concerned, we are prepared to explore all avenues towards a mutually acceptable agreement, including the suggestions which were submitted here by the eight new members of our Committee in their joint memorandum. An effective test ban with adequate safeguards against violations offers an immediate possibility for reducing the threat that nuclear weapons have created.

In closing, let me emphasize that both the United States and the Soviet Union, as their draft treaties indicate, recognize the urgent need to vanquish the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Both recognize that the threat will yield only to a mutual effort prodded on by a sense of urgency and co-operation. I do not wish to revive the earlier Conference debate of what constitutes a blueprint for the building of our disarmament house, but I do want to state that as regards this subject today we do have a common ground upon which to build -- that is to say, the desire to eliminate nuclear weapons which are the major threat to the security of the world.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

Today we have listened to a number of statements, in which various proposals were put forward and the positions of various delegations were explained, in connexion with discussion of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union and the outline of a treaty submitted by the United States.

In my statement today I do not intend to deal with the questions touched upon in these statements. The Soviet delegation will study the views expressed by the representatives of Nigeria, Czechoslovakia and the United States with a view to subsequent discussion in our Committee and an appropriate assessment in our statements.

I should like now to explain some of the articles of the draft treaty of the Soviet Union relating to the first stage of disarmament; but before doing so I should like to make a few comments on the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, on 2 May 1962, (ENDC/PV.29) especially as Mr. Godber touched on general questions concerning our policy and on specific questions under discussion at our Conference.

I shall begin with some general questions. Mr. Godber tried to call in question the truth of the statements made by the USSR Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, about the

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attitude adopted by Lord Home upon his return to London from Geneva. Mr. Godber asserted that the USSR Foreign Minister acted in the same way as some parliamentarians and arbitrarily cut short the quotation from Lord Home's speech in the House of Lords. In Mr. Godber's opinion the purpose of our Minister was to create a false impression. But I must say that such parliamentary methods are foreign to us, and if we quote anyone, even briefly, we keep the fundamental sense of what was said. Mr. Godber himself, apparently without wishing to do so, bore this out in his statement. He read out from Lord Home's speech a more extensive passage which in his opinion gave a true idea of what Lord Home said. But, Mr. Godber, in the second part of the quotation which you read out, Lord Home again put forward the same concept to which the USSR Foreign Minister drew attention, that the United Kingdom Government considers that tensions between States "... are, in any case, natural to life" (ENDC/PV.29, page 11). Such a concept, however, runs counter to the interest of creating normal, and not tense relations between states, relations of co-operation. This was precisely what Mr. Gromyko pointed out in his speech.

Your rebuttal therefore does not correspond to the real situation or to what Lord Home said. You merely confirmed that what was said by Lord Home and was quoted by Mr. Gromyko really corresponds to what Mr. Gromyko said at the session of the Supreme Soviet. Lord Home considers that tensions between States are in any case natural to life. We consider this to be wrong. I think that we are not alone in considering it wrong.

In turning now to the main theme of my statement today, I should like to point out that we have explained in detail at one of our previous meetings the first articles of the Soviet draft treaty concerning the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and in conjunction therewith the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories. Today I shall try to analyse the remaining articles of the first stage defining the obligations of States in regard to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

In these measures, as in all others, the Soviet Government steadfastly adheres to the principle of balanced disarmament, which would exclude the possibility of creating a military advantage for any State or group of States. It finds concrete expression in the fact that in our draft treaty the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, together with the simultaneous elimination of foreign military bases

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in alien territories, is linked in the first stage with a substantial reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments of States.

Article 11 of our draft treaty, which lays down the obligations of States in regard to reduction of their armed forces and conventional armaments, provides for the reduction of the armed forces of the States with the greatest military power - the Soviet Union and the United States - to the level of 1,700,000 men. There should be an equally drastic reduction of the armed forces of all other States. In the draft treaty we deliberately refrained from indicating specific figures for the force levels of other States. They must be the subject of agreement. It is necessary to stress, however, that the reduction of force levels for all the other States must be proportionately as large as for the Soviet Union and the United States.

Why did we adopt this figure of 1,700,000 men for the Soviet Union and the United States? This figure represents our desire to avoid unnecessary disputes and differences of opinion. I would remind you that precisely this level was mentioned at one time by the United States. In the memorandum regarding the conclusion of an agreement on a first step in the field of disarmament, which was transmitted by the United States delegation to the USSR delegation in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 31 May 1957, the United States expressed the hope that it would be possible to conduct negotiations for the reduction of armed forces to the level of 1,700,000 men.

At that time it was not a question of general and complete disarmament, which implies the willingness of States to agree to the most drastic steps to eliminate their military potential, but of an agreement on a first step in disarmament. If it was then considered possible to establish a level of 1,700,000 men, there is all the more justification for this level now when a treaty on general and complete disarmament is being prepared. I make no secret of the fact that we are surprised to find in the United States disarmament document the much higher figure of 2,100,000 men.

At the meetings on 24 and 25 April Mr. Dean spoke as if the United States wished to have much more extensive disarmament in the first stage than the Soviet Union. But the facts speak for themselves; the United States proposes to keep in the first stage considerably larger armed forces than the Soviet Union - 2,100,000 as against 1,700,000 men. At the meeting on 24 April Mr. Dean said:

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"Let me put it very clearly: the Soviet bloc probably has a preponderance of conventional military power which could be brought to bear in Europe at the present time. I think most military writers and strategists would be in agreement on that point. This preponderance is in large part offset by a relatively greater preponderance in the nuclear field held by the United States and its allies."

(ENDC/PV.26, page 12)

I am not a strategist, although Mr. Dean apparently claims to be something of the sort, and I shall not dispute his conclusions. Let us take these conclusions on trust. But what do we get then?

The Soviet Union, possessing in the estimation of the United States representative a preponderance of conventional armed forces, proposes a substantial reduction of armed forces. One would have thought that the United States, which, as Mr. Dean says, is concerned at the Soviet preponderance of conventional military power, would snatch at the large reduction figure proposed by the Soviet Union. But we are witnesses that for some reason the United States is against this reduction figure and proposes another and considerably smaller one. This flagrant contradiction in the United States position shows how fictitious are Mr. Dean's assertions concerning the so-called threat of the Soviet Union's conventional armaments to Europe. But this is not the only point refuting Mr. Dean's assertions.

We know that the number of armed forces which a State can put in the field has a direct connexion with the population figure. If we take the total population figure of the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries without the United States, we see that the Warsaw Treaty countries have a population of approximately 300 million while the NATO countries without the United States have a population of 287,134,000. This is quite apart from the fact that according to official statistics four NATO countries alone -- the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany -- had in 1961 more than 2.5 million men under arms, and quite apart from the other NATO members in Europe, which add about another million if not more, to the total strength of the armed forces of the four NATO countries in Europe which I have just mentioned. But where is the flood of armed human masses from the East threatening Europe, with which the political and military leaders of the Western Powers so often frighten the Western man-in-the-street? It is in fact an invention

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aimed at justifying the arms race and the formation of more and more divisions of the NATO bloc. It is to be regretted that this invention is also being repeated here in this Committee.

We must nevertheless obtain an answer to the question why the United States is not prepared to agree to a drastic reduction of conventional armed forces. It seems that the answer is to be found in the following facts. During the negotiations in London in 1957 the United States representatives directly indicated that with the retention of armed forces at the level of 2,100,000 men the United States would be able to keep without alteration the system of military bases in foreign territory and provide them with the necessary military personnel. When the disarmament question was being discussed at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, I recalled this fact, and I must say that my statement was not refuted by the United States delegation.

Ought we not to see in this the explanation of the fact that the United States, in limiting the reduction of armed forces in the first stage to the level of 2,100,000 men, does not provide in the same stage for the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories? If this is so, it turns out that the first stage of disarmament under the United States plan preserves the present structure of the Western military blocs with military bases in foreign territory in the front line.

This, it seems to us, is one of the reasons why the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy are particularly opposed to our treating foreign military bases separately and deciding the question of them apart from what are called military bases in one's own territory. I believe that this is not accidental. The role of foreign military bases in the military system of NATO is, of course, a specific one. The refusal to eliminate these bases and the simultaneous refusal of a drastic reduction in conventional armed forces are phenomena which are evidently interconnected.

But if that is the case, it means that the United States, United Kingdom and other NATO members do not, in fact, want from the very first stage of disarmament to ease in any way the existing tension in Europe, which is to a considerable extent connected with the presence of a large number of foreign military bases directed against a certain group of countries and definitely threatening them. We, of course, cannot agree with that. That is why we insist that already in the first stage, along with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, there should

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be, first, a drastic reduction of armed forces and, secondly, that foreign military bases should be eliminated. There would then be really equal and balanced disarmament on both sides.

At the meeting on 2 May Mr. Godber said that in modern warfare it is the armaments that are decisive rather than the number of men. I fully agree with the remarks made by the representative of India, Mr. Lall, on 3 May that if, in the opinion of the Western Powers, the number of men has lost its importance, then why not accept the level proposed by the Soviet Union of 1,700,000 and go even further and agree to the level of 1,500,000? I can state that the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to an even more drastic reduction of its own and other States' conventional armed forces. Therefore, Mr. Dean, if your figure of 2,100,000 men is not connected with the desire to keep foreign military bases, you should agree at least to a level of 1,700,000.

The Soviet Union wants an honest agreement without any ulterior motives and without any evil intentions "under the jackets", and therefore proposes the proper combination of the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles with the elimination of foreign military bases and a considerable reduction of armed forces.

I come now to reduction of conventional armaments. Our proposals in respect of this measure are set out in article 11, paragraph 3. I wish to point out that we have put the reduction of conventional armaments and the reduction of armed forces in the same article. This was not done accidentally, but in order to stress the close connexion between these measures.

In this connexion I should like to refer once more to the statement made by Mr. Godber on 2 May, in which he tried to create the impression that the Soviet Union lays undue emphasis on the reduction of armed forces and gives less importance to the reduction of conventional armaments. No, Mr. Godber, we attach great importance to both questions and regard them as closely and indissolubly interconnected.

In making a comparative analysis of the United States document and our draft treaty, Mr. Dean asserted that the Soviet Union is proposing only limited and unspecified cuts in conventional armaments. In his opinion the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of the different categories of conventional armaments is less limited and more specific than the Soviet proposal and, as he said, preferable to it. I do not wish to deprive Mr. Dean of the right to consider his proposal preferable. There is even a Russian proverb which says: "Every snipe praises his own bog."

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Mr. Godber also praised the United States proposal. This, apparently, was due to what the French call "noblesse oblige" -- that is, one's position entails obligation. Mr. Godber's position as a partner of the United States obviously entails this obligation.

Position is one thing but facts are another, and we cannot agree at all with the arguments of the United States and United Kingdom representatives about the unspecified nature of the Soviet Union's proposals for the reduction of conventional armaments. In fact what does article 11, paragraph 3 of our draft treaty say? It reads:

"All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the disbanded units shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses." (ENDC/2, page 10)

Apparently the wording is quite clear and precise. What does this destruction of all armaments and military equipment mean? It means that if, for example, on one of the days of the first stage of disarmament a division is being disbanded according to plan, all the armaments and military equipment of that division from tanks to rifles, from shells to cartridges, will be destroyed. Of course, all nuclear weapon vehicles will also be destroyed in accordance with our proposal for their complete elimination in the first stage.

I draw your attention to paragraph 4 of the same article 11, which shows that the disbandment of such a division and any other military formation and the destruction of its equipment will be carried out under the control of inspectors on the spot. What other aim except that of obscuring a perfectly clear matter can Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber have in talking about the lack of clarity of the Soviet proposal and about the alleged danger it contains of a transfer and replacement of categories or types of armaments?

Mr. Dean also found a lack of clarity in regard to the demobilization of armed forces personnel. In our opinion everything is set out with sufficient clearness and precision in the draft treaty of the Soviet Union. We do not want a repetition of past history when, with the connivance of the Entente countries, the Black Reichswehr was kept and became the nucleus of Hitler's army. A well-known device was used - the soldiers were disbanded but the backbone of the army, the officers, was kept. To prevent a repetition of this device we provide

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that the reduction of the armed forces must be carried out primarily through the complete disbandment of units and formations, their complete elimination.

Now for the statement that the Soviet proposal concerning the reduction of conventional armaments is more limited than the United States proposal. I draw your attention to the fact that the United States in its document mentions a 30 per cent reduction of only four categories of conventional armaments, namely, categories 7, 8, 9 and 10 in the United States list, although it is indispensable to say that some of them are related to the means of delivery. The question arises: what will happen, under the United States plan, to the other non-listed categories of armaments? The United States is silent on this score.

Now let us turn to the Soviet draft treaty. There we mention the reduction not of four separate categories, but the reduction of all armaments, all military equipment, all munitions and all means of transportation and subsidiary equipment. In that case who is providing for a more comprehensive reduction of conventional armaments? Is it those who speak about four categories of these armaments, or those who provide for a reduction of all types of armaments and military equipment without exception?

There is yet one more serious difference between the United States proposal and that of the USSR with regard to the volume of the reduction of conventional armaments. The United States propose a 30 per cent reduction. But where is the guarantee that this 30 per cent reduction of conventional armaments will lead to the complete elimination of armament reserves? There is no such guarantee. Consequently there will be left in storage armaments which can be used for the immediate deployment of armed forces at the level of 2,100,000 men and over.

Let us take a look at article 11, paragraph 3 of the Soviet draft treaty. There we read:

"Conventional armaments and equipment intended for reserve forces shall also be destroyed." (ENDC/2, page 10)

Taking this into account, what does the entire paragraph 3 of article 11 mean? It means that under the Soviet draft treaty States will be left with only the armaments which are necessary to equip the agreed force levels and no more. Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber do not see this. But we are gratified to note that the meaning of our proposal is understood by other delegations, as has become apparent from their recent statements.

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The United States proposal, on the contrary, permits the retention of all armaments not included in the four categories listed by Mr. Dean, and some reserve armaments of these four categories over and above the quantity available in military units. Thus in making an objective analysis it is impossible not to come to the conclusion that in the field of conventional armaments reduction the United States proposals are very far from removing the burden of armaments and decreasing the very real danger of an outbreak of military conflict.

I shall not weary you by analysing the United States proposal in connexion with the production of conventional armaments and military equipment during the first stage. The general outline is the same as in regard to the production of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons: that is to say, it is subordinated to the purpose, on the one hand, of keeping the industrial base and consequently the possibility of rapidly re-establishing armed forces at their former or even a higher level and, on the other, of justifying the most extensive controls.

The Soviet Union's proposal concerning the reduction of conventional armaments production is set out in article 12 of our draft treaty. This article provides for reducing the production of conventional armaments and munitions proportionately to the reduction of the armed forces of States. We propose that this reduction shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. Inspectors of the international disarmament organization are to be given the opportunity of verifying the execution of such measures on the spot.

The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union contains appropriate provisions concerning the reduction of military budgets and appropriations for military purposes. Article 13 of the draft treaty is devoted to this question. We consider that the reduction of military budgets should be carried out so as to correspond to the disarmament measures provided for in the first stage.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to stipulate, and has done so in the Soviet draft treaty, that all funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. At the same time a certain portion of the funds thus released, the amount of which is to be subject to agreement between the parties to the treaty, is to be diverted to economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. Thus

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the first stage of disarmament, that is the first eighteen months of the existence of mankind without the arms race, will bring to the peoples of the world, besides the joyful awareness of their liberation from the terrifying spectre of a nuclear catastrophe, a considerable raising of their standard of living both materially and spiritually.

Other articles of our draft treaty devote due attention to the question of safeguarding the security of States from the very beginning of the process of disarmament. Chapter III of our draft treaty is devoted to measures to safeguard the security of States during the first stage of disarmament.

As one of these measures, article 14 deals with restriction of displacements of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. It states that from the very beginning of the first stage and until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships, and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, shall be prohibited. The fulfilment of these obligations is guaranteed by the necessary control on the part of the international disarmament organization, which, through its inspectors, is to exercise control over the launching of rockets for peaceful purposes, as provided for in article 14 of the draft treaty. The international disarmament organization would also keep check on the movements of military aircraft within their national frontiers and of warships within their territorial waters.

We think that the implementation of these measures will provide a serious obstacle to an attempt on the part of any party to the treaty to carry out any aggression during the first stage. At the same time, all States parties to the treaty would be equally subject to these restrictions and not one of them would be in a more or less advantageous position.

These are the disarmament measures envisaged by the Soviet draft treaty in the first stage of disarmament. We believe that a start can be made to carry out all these measures six months after the treaty comes into force, during which period the international disarmament organization would be created. We propose that the duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be eighteen months, as laid down in article 19 of our draft treaty. This is a completely adequate and

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realistic time-limit. The peoples of the world need disarmament, and we have no right to delay its implementation.

I shall not conceal that the remarks made by Mr. Godber at our meeting on 2 May regarding the time-limit of the first stage of disarmament have caused us some anxiety. Mr. Godber in fact moved away from acceptance of the need to set definite time-limits. He said that we should not over-stress the time-limit. (ENDC/PV.29, page 6). He assured us that it would be sufficient to have merely -- "some idea of how long the disarmament process is going to take". (ibid).

The sense of Mr. Godber's reasoning amounted, so we gathered, to a justification of delay in implementing the disarmament programme. The Soviet delegation is strongly opposed to that approach.

We fully share the views expressed by the representative of India, Mr. Lall, at our meeting of 3 May regarding the importance of setting the shortest possible time-limit for disarmament. This is a correct approach - an approach dictated by his desire to achieve genuine disarmament. Mr. Lall quite rightly pointed out that --

"... if the process of disarmament were laggard, slow and tentative, it would be much easier to set the clock back, to arrest a slow process".

(ENDC/PV.30, page 16)

Furthermore, he noted that the United States plan was a little unclear about the total length of a disarmament programme. This is a point we have made in our previous statements. It is a fact.

A number of facts, some of which concern the transition from one stage to another and which I mentioned at our meeting of 3 May, regrettably compel us to the conclusion that the unwillingness of the United States to set a definite time limit for the whole of the disarmament programme, and the attempt of the United Kingdom delegate to introduce again an element of uncertainty into the question of the time limit of the first stage, are not accidental. They obviously reflect the desire of the Western Powers, which was manifested very clearly on 3 May, to reduce the whole matter, instead of general and complete disarmament, to some limited measures arbitrarily chosen from the programme in order to justify their demand for the establishment of control over armaments.

During the last two meetings a number of representatives touched upon questions of control in connexion with the disarmament measures of the first stage. The

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same thing happened this morning. First of all, I wish to point out that, in looking through the verbatim records of our deliberations, the Soviet delegation had a feeling of great satisfaction. The Soviet Union invariably maintained the position that, before considering and agreeing on questions of control, it is necessary to reach agreement on the disarmament measures. In past years the Western Powers have steadfastly opposed this, and tried to put control in the foreground and to push the actual disarmament measures into the background. A great deal of time was lost as a result of this approach by the Western Powers, who endeavoured to turn control into an end in itself. And now in a statement by Mr. Dean we find him recognizing that we should discuss the control obligations concretely, having before us some idea of the substantive measures to which these controls are to be applied (ENDC/PV.29, page 24).

The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and, in particular, the first stage in this draft treaty, assumes the necessity of establishing strict international control over the implementation of disarmament measures. I should like to stress once more the main idea which guided the Soviet Government in drafting its proposals regarding control. The Soviet Government carefully weighed all aspects of the question and consistently followed the line that at each stage the volume of control must strictly correspond to the number and nature of the disarmament measures to be carried out. This approach makes it possible, on the one hand, to ensure strict and impartial verification of each of the agreed disarmament measures and, on the other hand, does not lead in any way to an infringement of the national security interests of States. The implementation of disarmament measures, but not the armed forces and armaments of States are to be placed under control. We are convinced that this is fully adequate for effectively verifying that the disarmament measures are being carried out by States.

In defending the United States document, Mr. Godber expressed his displeasure at the statement of the Foreign Minister of the USSR and our statement in the Committee drawing attention to the unacceptable nature of the United States proposals on control. Mr. Godber alleged that the Soviet Foreign Minister had distorted the United States proposal on so-called zonal inspection to such an extent that it no longer resembled the original, and that the United States proposal had

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been falsely interpreted as another form of control over armaments. Both Mr. Godber and Mr. Dean, who has done it again today, went to great lengths to prove that the purpose of the proposal for zonal inspection was to link the volume of control to the volume of disarmament measures. They even said that this proposal was an attempt to meet the position of the Soviet Union.

It is a pretty fine step to meet the position of the Soviet Union, if all it amounts to is to force through, albeit in a somewhat altered form, the same old control over armaments. In principle, it makes no difference whether comprehensive control is established on the entire territory of a country immediately or on some part of its territory to begin with. This is, if you like, a change in the methods of intelligence but not in its substance. The Western Powers have realized the complete groundlessness of their position regarding the establishment of control over armaments and have understood the absurdity of their demand that States should open up the whole of their territory for foreign controllers even before disarmament begins. So now they are trying to modify their demand and make it look a little better.

In this connexion I must say that Mr. Dean's statement of 2 May indicates quite clearly that the proposal for zonal inspection is in fact merely a cover for the old demand for the establishment of comprehensive control. Here is what Mr. Dean said at the meeting of 2 May:

"In the case of limitations or prohibitions of production, the system of progressive zonal disarmament would operate in more or less the same way. Initially the limitations or prohibitions would be on the basis of declared plants and those plants would be subject to inspection wherever they were located." (ENDC/PV.29, page 28)

Thus the plants would be subject to inspection wherever they were located. What does this mean with reference to the first stage? It means that all plants producing, say, the means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be placed under control on the day after the treaty comes into force. It also means that all plants producing the various types of conventional armaments would also be placed under control. The only field left outside would apparently be the plants producing nuclear weapons. But even this is doubtful, it seems, because the United States, as Mr. Dean explained in detail today, insists on the cessation of production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons in order

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to justify the establishment of control in this field as well. Is this not the widest comprehensive control over the entire military industrial potential of States in circumstances in which disarmament would be very, very insignificant under the United States plan? Does Mr. Godber regard this as a far-reaching step by the United States towards meeting the position of the Soviet Union which is striving for effective control, namely control over disarmament and not control over armaments?

The Western Powers' concept was developed in a similar direction by Mr. Burns at the meeting on 3 May. Speaking of the reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, he stressed that:

"... territory must be inspected before the reduction of the nuclear weapon delivery capability below the level of deterrent which now exists, or which would exist after the reduction." (ENDC/PV.30, page 11)

Mr. Burns' views were supported by Mr. Dean. But is it not a matter of finding out, of intelligence work before even a single missile or a single bomber has been destroyed?

Although Mr. Dean tried yesterday, just as he did today, to justify in some way the United States proposal for zonal inspection, I must say frankly that he did not succeed in doing so. Nothing in his statements indicated that the United States had abandoned its desire to establish control over armaments.

Mr. Godber tried to present the fact that we found it possible to criticize the United States proposal on control in the way it deserved to be criticized, as evidence of the Soviet Union's loss of interest in general and complete disarmament; and this, you see, disturbs him very much. In this connexion I shall not recall who was the initiator of the proposal concerning general and complete disarmament, or whose opposition had to be overcome in order to secure at the United Nations General Assembly the adoption of a resolution concerning the preparation of an agreement on such disarmament, although it would serve as a good illustration to Mr. Godber's remarks. But I will now draw your attention to something else.

Mr. Godber spoke at some length about the fact that seven months had elapsed since the joint principles were agreed, yet the Soviet Union had not submitted any basically new proposals on questions of control, but showed a negative attitude towards the United States proposal for zonal inspection. Mr. Godber even tried to put the matter in the following way: if the Soviet Union does not bring forward

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any new proposal on the question of control, this will be, in his own words, "an acid test of the sincerity of our Soviet colleagues." (ENDC/PV.29, page 16)

It is useless for you, Mr. Godber, to try to put the Soviet Union in the position of the side that is being tested. You should not forget that at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, made the following direct appeal to your Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan: "Accept our proposals for general and complete disarmament and the Soviet Union will be prepared to accept your proposals concerning control over such disarmament". Since then the Soviet Government has repeatedly put forward its proposal. Where is your answer to this? There is none.

Where is your agreement to accept the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament, or even the proposal to eliminate during the first stage all the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases, to withdraw troops from foreign territories, and thus free the peoples of the world from the threat of a nuclear war? Where is your agreement to accept the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination and destruction of nuclear weapons during the second stage? This, too, is lacking.

The weeks which we have passed here in Geneva have shown more clearly than ever that the attitude of the United States, and of the United Kingdom as well, consists in avoiding a straightforward and honest obligation to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, to destroy nuclear weapons completely, and to bring about the total elimination of the military machinery of States within short time limits. Even today, Mr. Dean, referring to the statement of Mr. Rusk, pointed out that it was necessary to carry out a scientific study of the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons and that without this it would be impossible to destroy nuclear weapons unconditionally. You do not wish to accept even in principle the proposal for the destruction of all nuclear weapons. You make this dependent upon a scientific study of this question in the future.

The Western Powers do not stand up to the test to which they are put by life itself, and this is becoming clearer every day. It is, therefore, not a question of our position, but of yours.

The Soviet delegation is always prepared to listen attentively to those who strive sincerely to clarify questions in order to find a common basis for agreement. I must say that we listened with great attention to the statement made by the

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representative of India, Mr. Lall, who put forward a number of interesting ideas concerning possible ways of solving the problem of control. We believe that serious attention should be given to his idea that:

"If we proceed in a businesslike, sharp manner down the road of disarmament, then the control measures are easier to handle ..."

(ENDC/PV.30, p.23)

This is a sober and sensible idea, and should be taken into account in discussing and reaching agreement on questions of control.

We cannot, of course, overlook the questions raised by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, at the meeting on 24 April (ENDC/PV.26, p.16). He referred to them again yesterday, (ENDC/PV.30, p.) and apparently wished to get us to hurry up with our reply. He referred to my statement that, as the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, has explained more than once, the Soviet Union is prepared to accept any proposal for control over disarmament which the Western Powers put forward, if they will accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Burns thinks that there are three possible interpretations of this statement of the Soviet Government. The first might be as follows: the West accepts a given measure of disarmament within the Soviet plan and they - that is the Soviet Union - accept whatever control provisions we attach to that measure. I must say that Mr. Burns' formulation is very unclear and indefinite. If he means that the Western Powers can agree to some separate measure of disarmament and thus isolate it from the general programme of disarmament, then I must say immediately that agreement on this basis is, of course, impossible. At the present time, given the existing relations between States and the present level of military technology, the only way to solve the problem of disarmament, as everyone knows, is general and complete disarmament. For this reason the isolation of individual measures would not lead to the solution of the problem of disarmament but to an impasse. Consequently this argument of Mr. Burns falls to the ground.

Unfortunately, Mr. Burns was inclined to apply this interpretation also at yesterday's meeting to the question of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. But this problem as we have repeatedly pointed out, should be considered in the context of the first stage, in the context of the simultaneous dismantling of foreign military bases in alien territories and other disarmament measures.

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Another interpretation by Mr. Burns was the following: the West not only accepts the entire Soviet plan, but must also wait until it - or something very like it - is implemented down to the third stage, and then they, that is the Soviet Union, will be prepared to accept whatever control provisions we, that is the West, choose. No, Mr. Burns; we do not have such an interpretation in mind. It is perfectly clear that such an interpretation would mean disarmament without any control. We will not accept that kind of disarmament, nor will we accept control without disarmament. We are striving for and demand disarmament under strict international control from the very beginning to the very end. Thus this interpretation also is inappropriate.

There was another interpretation by Mr. Burns: the West accepts the entire Soviet plan and they - that is the Soviet Union - accept any control measures we propose for the disarmament programme. This interpretation by Mr. Burns is the nearest to the truth. We understand the matter in the following way: if the Western Powers accept the Soviet plan for disarmament with all its wide and thorough-going measures, with all their consequences, we will give carte blanche to the Western Powers to work out measures of control over each of these disarmament measures. They will be free to work out and to propose such measures of control over disarmament as they believe to be necessary. It is self-evident that these must be measures of control over disarmament and not control over armaments. In other words, control must correspond to the disarmament measures. The Western Powers, judging from the agreed principles of disarmament, agreed to such a provision, and they must take it as their starting point in drafting their proposals for control over disarmament.

In this connexion I should like to point out once again that in our draft each measure of disarmament is accompanied by references to the corresponding measures of control. It is on this basis that we hope to reach agreement.

Those are the views which I considered it necessary to put forward today in order to clarify our position in regard to the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and in regard to questions of control.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): As we have no other names on the list of speakers, I should like to make a few remarks in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom.

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We have this morning carried on the discussions in relation to the two drafts before us (ENDC/2, ENDC/30 and Corr.1). These discussions have ranged very widely. I should like to say straight away, however, that I was extremely interested in the statement made at the beginning of the meeting this morning by the representative of Nigeria. I thought that it was a very carefully balanced, well-thought-out speech, not inclining to accept the views entirely of either side, showing some of the difficulties. I hope we shall all study it very closely. I think that sort of speech can help us a great deal.

This morning we have had a perfect example of contrasts in debating techniques. We had the Nigerian representative speaking to us calmly and objectively about the matters before us, and we had the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union, which marked the other extreme of our debate. I think that when one compares these two approaches there is little doubt about which is the more effective in persuading representatives as to where true merit lies. But we have had these various speeches, and I am sure that we shall all want to consider the points that have been raised in them. We have, after all, over the last three days, had a fairly general debate, ranging round those same problems.

I think straight away I ought to take up -- I will not dwell on this -- the opening phrases of the representative of the Soviet Union. He did his best to stand up for his own Foreign Minister -- and I do not blame him for doing that at all. But it was really rather a pitiful effort, was it not? Members of this Conference recall very well -- I hope they do, anyway -- what I said on Wednesday. But Mr. Zorin still tried to argue that what Lord Home had said in the House of Lords was that tension was in any case a natural thing. But Lord Home did not say that. If members of this Conference have forgotten, I will just recall for them what Lord Home said. I gave the full quotation at a previous meeting. I think, in view of what was said this morning, I must give it again.

Lord Home said:

"The Russians do not want war, but they want peace on Communist terms. They say that they want coexistence, but they want their own interpretation of coexistence. I suppose we must accept this tension, and, indeed, tension may be part of our human condition; it may be a pre-condition of progress, and that without tension we stagnate. But it is neither wise nor good when great nations artificially stimulate,

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for political or ideological reasons, tensions which are, in any case, natural to life. It is dangerous for those nations who promote the tension, because it can boomerang on themselves. It is possible -- and we have learnt this over the last few months -- to coexist and to co-operate." (ENDC/PV.29, p.11)

It is abundantly clear from this that Lord Home was not saying that tension is a natural thing. He was saying that we are forced to accept it. He said, "I suppose we must accept this tension" -- not tension in general, but tension created by the Soviet Union. And he went on to say that it was unfortunate that we have got to live with it. Let us not have any more travesties of misrepresentation. The matter is so abundantly clear that I do not propose to labour it further.

But I am interested in the general debating tactics which our Soviet colleague is adopting in our Conference now. The tactics have changed very considerably over the last few weeks -- it is just as well to recognize that fact. Earlier on we were having very objective debates. But in the last fortnight our Soviet colleague has sought completely to change the tone of our debates, to abandon calm consideration and dispassionate debate. He has sought to drag us down into a debate charged with emotion and full of polemical statements, so that we have now reached the stage when every speech that he makes is littered -- yes, littered -- with emotional and quite unfounded charges against the West. Usually it is my United States colleague who is the arch villain; today I have had the honour of filling that place.

But what interests me most is why these tactics have been adopted at all. Cast your minds back. Before Easter these tactics were not adopted. They have been introduced very gradually. It has been done very carefully. But why have they been adopted, and, particularly, why at this time? Is it that our Soviet colleague wants to draw us away from serious debates altogether? Is it that perhaps he felt a little uncomfortable in regard to some of the serious debates and some of the points put to him? I wonder. I think it is worth our while to consider this.

But what does it matter if, in fact, one or another representative gets the best of a particular day's debate? This is not an abstract debating society. It does not matter who wins a particular debate. What we ought to be doing is

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considering, quite calmly and in a serious manner, the two plans before us, deciding whether the proposals in one plan or the other are most suitable for a particular measure. It does not help if one party to these discussions continually, in every speech, accuses another party of bad faith.

Now I respect the skill of our Soviet colleague enough to know that he knows this very well. It follows that he must have a motive for these tactics. It is just as well to wonder what, in fact, his motive is. We had a repetition of these tactics today. It was abundantly clear that he was embarrassed -- yes, embarrassed -- by some of the points that had been put by other representatives, and that rather than replying to them calmly and objectively, arguing out the position, he has chosen these other tactics; and, of course, he has chosen them when we have reached a particular stage in our discussions. We have reached the phase now, starting with the first-stage measures, which will involve consideration of many detailed problems. In the Soviet draft treaty there is an initial article proposing certain important measures to be taken in stage I; and in the United States draft there are, equally, certain proposals for the first stage. We have started to consider these proposals.

Now is it that our Soviet colleague does not want serious debate on some of these issues? Is it that he does not want us to consider, calmly and in a reasonable atmosphere, the various proposals that have been put forward? Today he has made various charges against the West. I pass over the one against me, which he has made once or twice before, to the effect that the United Kingdom representatives are not free in these discussions. I would assure him we are free enough. The United Kingdom has always been free, and is ready to consider any honest argument from whatever quarter it comes. I would have thought that I, and Lord Home before me, have shown in our discussions around this table that we are free enough to consider factual arguments and to weigh them on their merits. But this was just one of the tactics of Mr. Zorin's abuse of the West, seeking to create doubts in people's minds, seeking almost to smear, which I deplore. He has talked a good deal about some of these issues that come up in relation particularly to his own article 4, and he has referred today to some of the later articles. Of course, two main things stand out in article 4 of the Soviet treaty. One is the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, and the other is elimination of foreign bases.

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Of course, Mr. Zorin knows perfectly well that those are issues which it would be quite impossible for the West to accept without breaching point 5 of the Agreed Principles. And so I suppose this is one of the reasons for the smokescreen which is being thrown against us. I do not propose to fall into that.

Let us consider dispassionately what in fact is involved in these two proposals -- the 100 per cent reduction and the elimination of foreign bases -- because if one takes them together they must mean that the Soviet Union, at least in so far as Europe is concerned, is going to be in a dominant position at the end of the first stage. It means that there will no longer be any possibility for Western European nations to defend themselves, if they have to defend themselves, adequately against the remaining conventional might of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Zorin knows that just as well as I do, and it is because of this sort of thing that I think he is choosing to turn the debate in the way that he does. I think this is regrettable.

But what are we really considering in this? We all share -- yes, all of us, in spite of accusations which have been made -- a genuine desire to achieve general and complete disarmament. But what we are discussing now are the stages in which we achieve it, which comes first and in what order we do it. It is not a vital point -- it is important but it cannot be shown to be vital to the success of our ultimate task -- if we say that all nuclear delivery vehicles must be got rid of in the first stage but do not make adequate references to the nuclear weapons themselves.

I would commend to my colleagues the very thoughtful speech made by Mr. Burns yesterday (ENDC/PV.30, pages 6 et seq.) in which he advanced two sets of dangers in relation to this particular problem. First, he showed that, if the weapons were left and if one had tried to get rid of the means of delivery, there would be clandestine ways in which delivery of nuclear weapons could be effected even after the most careful elimination. Therefore this is a most unreal argument with which we are being faced.

The other point in relation to that which Mr. Burns advanced was a very telling one and has received no effective reply as yet. He asked: Just how are you going to control this reduction? Our Soviet colleague says that of course you

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will get 100 per cent control over this reduction if you accept this proposal. But it does not come automatically; indeed, a mere undertaking to agree to a 100 per cent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles does not automatically guarantee the achievement of strict international control.

On Wednesday Mr. Zorin said:

"The Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage also ensures the solution of the problem of strict international control." (ENDC/PV.29, p.36)

It does nothing of the sort; it poses the problem more acutely but does not ensure such control.

This brings me to the whole question of verification, which figured very largely in what Mr. Zorin said to us today, just as it figured in my own remarks on Wednesday. I said then that the key to the whole process was to get an adequate and effective means of control. I am not seeking control before disarmament, but I am seeking to know what measures of verification our Soviet colleagues are willing to accept in order to facilitate the disarmament process. But again today, in spite of all he said on this subject, Mr. Zorin gave us no positive suggestion for dealing with the questions which I posed in a closely reasoned argument over five pages of the verbatim record last Wednesday. I am not going to repeat them all now, but as Mr. Zorin referred to me I will quote again one paragraph:

"If our Soviet colleagues really want general and complete disarmament, if they really want this Conference to succeed, then they should have been racking their brains to find a solution to this obvious major point of difference. Maybe I am wronging them; perhaps they have been doing this. If so, I hope they will give us the fruits of their thoughts in relation to it." (ENDC/PV.29, p.16)

Then I went on to pose the problem. I can quote it all if Mr. Zorin wishes, but it is there in the record. I am not seeking to hide anything at all. The point is, I posed this problem, and I do ask members to consider this, because it is fundamental to how one is going to reconcile the attitude which our Soviet colleague takes on verification with the measures which he says he is willing to carry out and have effectively verified. It arises in an acute form in relation to the abolition of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, if he is proposing that in the first stage, but it

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arises in many other aspects too. It arises in those cases where, as he himself today has reminded us, he is proposing a reduction in forces to 1.7 million. How is he going to achieve that, when in the next breath he tells us -- as he told us the other day -- that the Soviet Union is not going to accept the word of the West, nor would it expect the West to accept its word?

This is very important indeed in relation to the speech he made this morning. He quoted to us article 11 of the Soviet draft treaty, in particular paragraph 3, which showed that the reduction of conventional armaments would be tied precisely to the reduction of armed forces. Therefore, if you are establishing your force level at 1.7 million -- for the sake of argument -- then you are establishing the remaining conventional weapons at the same level. It is therefore essential that you should have adequate assurance that that in fact is the level of troops, because if you do not have that, it follows from Mr. Zorin's own article that, if forces are not brought down to that level, the weapons are not brought down to a comparable level either.

There must be a way out of this. We have got to succeed, and we have got to have from our Soviet colleagues some effective explanation of what they propose.

Our United States colleague put forward the proposal of zonal inspection. He did not say it was exclusive: he put it forward as an idea. The Soviet representatives do not like it. All right -- let them suggest what they would like. Let them put forward something so that we can analyze it. It is so very easy merely to pour scorn on a proposal put forward by others, but this is a very real problem that we face. So I do ask our Soviet colleagues once more not to spend so much time in abusing the West: that is not helping forward our negotiations. It would be very easy for me to retaliate in the same vein -- I believe I could almost give as good as I got -- but I have no desire at all to try to do that. That is not what I have come here for. It seems to me a rather stupid game. We have got to have positive proposals so that we can move forward, because all our efforts can succeed only if we have a solution to this. It really is vital. So I ask our Soviet colleague again in all good faith to look at this, to forget polemics for a bit, and to let us have the considered proposals of his own Government to meet this specific point -- because if he does not, he is not going to help us forward at all.

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He has brought out again that very hackneyed old statement -- I am surprised; I think he must be short of material -- which has been trotted out so many times by himself and his colleagues: "If the West will accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament, then we, the Soviet Union, will accept your proposals on control". That has been said a good many times. Mr. Zorin said this morning that it had not been answered. Well, I have answered it myself more than once. I thought I had answered it in New York, to him. But it has been answered plenty of times.

The simple fact is this. If you bring forward proposals which are so loaded on one side that you know they cannot be accepted by others -- and that is one of the factors which we have got to correct in the Soviet approach here -- then it is perfectly easy to say "We will accept your controls". But in fact we have never had any definition of what is meant by accepting our controls. Indeed, on this 100 per cent reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles which our Soviet colleague proposes, he has not shown us the degree of control he would accept in relation to it if it were accepted. He says he would accept full control; but, as Mr. Burns showed us the other day in his very penetrating speech, this could involve inspectors going all over the Soviet Union. Indeed it could. Mr. Zorin cannot expect us simply to accept his statement that all nuclear delivery vehicles will be put in a certain spot where we can inspect their destruction. He really cannot expect us to accept that statement. Therefore he is complicating the verification issue by trying to push too much of one particular type of disarmament into the first stage.

Unless Mr. Zorin says that in putting forward this proposal he is willing for the international disarmament organization not only to inspect the spots where the Soviet Union tells us these nuclear delivery vehicles are, but also to inspect such other spots where we think they might be hidden -- unless he is willing to give that freedom, in fact he is not proposing 100 per cent verification of the destruction of this particular type of armaments. That is why I say that in bringing forward this proposal in the first stage he is complicating the verification issue, because this would compel the West to insist on the right to have full inspection over the Soviet Union to ensure that all these particular nuclear delivery vehicles had been destroyed.

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If it were done more gradually, if it were done across the board, as our United States colleagues propose, so that there would be 30 per cent of everything destroyed in the first stage, then it ought to be possible, with good will, to work out a system whereby one could have 30 per cent inspection -- comparable inspection to destruction. But if the degree of destruction is changed as between different types, then the inspection issue is complicated if in fact there is to be the same percentage of inspection as of destruction, because then one comes up against the cases of 100 per cent in one case and 30 per cent in another.

Therefore, if our Soviet colleagues are so concerned about this issue of inspection, they should not be proposing issues which complicate it; they should be trying to find means of getting round this difficulty. I do ask our Soviet colleagues to face up to this. They have not done so yet. I hope very much that they will, because it is essential that we really do make effective progress.

I want to get ahead with the treaty, and I would say, in regard to these comparable articles leading us into stage I, that quite clearly, whatever our views in relation to them, there is no need whatever to pinpoint either of these points with which Mr. Zorin has made such play -- the 100 per cent elimination, or the abolition of foreign bases; there is no need actually to refer to these particular matters in this initial article. Let us all take further time for thought about them. Let us agree an initial article which does not deliberately pinpoint points of difficulty. Let us agree an article leading us to the substantive stages, and then let us argue out, on the particular articles concerned, where we are going to proceed on some of these matters. That will give more time for our colleagues around this table to consider this fundamental problem -- it is fundamental, as I tried to pose it on Wednesday, and we have got to find a solution. I do earnestly ask our Soviet colleagues to seek to find a solution and not merely to get away from serious debate and indulge in harsh criticism of the West. I could criticize the East just as easily, but it does not get us anywhere.

I apologize for keeping my colleagues, but after the speech we have just listened to I felt it would be wrong for me to allow us to depart without stating quite clearly where the United Kingdom stands on this particular point. We shall want to return to some of the other issues raised here in a subsequent debate.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I should not, of course, have asked for leave to speak at this late hour had it not been for your lengthy statement, Mr. Chairman, as representative of the United Kingdom. I certainly do not wish to trespass on our time at present by answering you on a number of questions. I shall do so later. I wish, however, to draw your attention to two points.

The first point. You said that there had been a change of tone in my statements. I think this is far-fetched. If all listened carefully, I do not think they found any different tone. I spoke in the same tone as usual, and I would even say that today I spoke in a calmer tone than in the past. In my opinion the United Kingdom representative knows this quite as well as anyone else, because in the past I have answered him, in particular, much more sharply than I have done today. But if he thinks he has noticed a change of tone, let him look at what he said on 2 May. I have done no more than he himself did on 2 May. No more. He tried rather venomously to raise certain questions, to criticize our position, and so forth. I answered him more or less in the same tone. There was nothing beyond that, in my opinion.

Therefore I think that all this raising of the question of a change of tone is far-fetched, and also conceals certain tactics on the part of Mr. Godber. If he spoke of certain new tactics, which do not exist at all in the Soviet delegation, then in respect of this approach there really is a certain tactical device on the part of Mr. Godber.

What is the gist of it? I come to my second remark. The gist of the matter is that the day before yesterday, yesterday and today I considered in detail the Soviet Union proposals relating to the first stage of disarmament. I considered in detail and in a businesslike manner the corresponding proposals of the United States, and I criticized them. Just as you have criticized our plan, I criticized your plan, and at the same time I showed the advantages of our proposals and the shortcomings of your proposals.

It is my impression that it is precisely this criticism of your positions and the defence of our positions by fairly cogent arguments that is the cause of your nervous reaction. That is the whole point. You are unable to put forward sound arguments to justify your position, and therefore you get rather nervous. But that cannot be helped. In particular, you said today, for instance, that the

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Soviet Union would be in a dominant position at the end of the first stage. But you have not proved this. You have not put forward a single argument; whereas today I have put forward arguments which reduce to naught all your talk about the Soviet Union having an alleged advantage in respect of conventional armaments, because we propose a more drastic reduction of conventional armaments than you. Yet you level at us the reproach that we should retain our advantage in respect of conventional armaments. But there is no logic in your position, and you cannot put forward any arguments to justify it. That is why you get nervous and say that we have changed our tone. We have done nothing of the kind. We have not changed our tone, but we do have fairly serious and strong arguments which you have so far been unable, unfortunately, to refute.

Further, you talk about inspection of the entire territory of States in connexion with the 100 per cent reduction and elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Today you refer to Mr. Burns and asked: "Do you agree to the 100 per cent inspection of the entire territory of the Soviet Union?" I answered you yesterday and I answer you today: as regards verification of the 100 per cent reduction or elimination of the means of delivery, we agree to such verification throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. What more do you need? You say that this does not guarantee, does not provide any guarantee that verification will take place. Then what is it you want? I do not understand. I am telling you that we agree to 100 per cent verification and I add: 100 per cent throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. What more do you need? What other verification do you need? You say that this provides no guarantee. Then what would provide you with a guarantee?

You, in your plan, wish to reduce the means of delivery by 30 per cent; but you wish to have 100 per cent verification and to keep the bases as well. That suits you, but it is obvious to everyone that it cannot possibly suit any other State, because it will be a manifest advantage for you; and besides, there will be 100 per cent verification of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union without any guarantee that after this 30 per cent reduction you will agree to a further reduction.

We may well ask which is more convincing: what we propose or what you propose. We propose 100 per cent elimination of all means of delivery and 100 per cent control throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. Why do you not accept this? I will

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

tell you why. You say: "We cannot eliminate foreign bases". That is why you do not accept our proposal. We demand the simultaneous elimination of foreign bases. Moreover, you do not want to eliminate the means of delivery by 100 per cent, because you do not want general and complete disarmament. That is the crux of the matter. But that is my view. You may disagree with it. But I draw this conclusion because so far you have not brought forward any convincing arguments against our position. And that perturbs and worries you. That is why you say that our tone is not to your liking.

But I assure you that I think that everyone present here today felt that my tone was calm; it will also be calm in the future. Today we analysed all your arguments in a businesslike manner and put forward our own arguments. So now sit down and read our document, go through all our arguments and prepare reasoned objections against them. Let us have your arguments and then everyone will see what is the matter. You will not save the situation by referring to some sort of tone. You must produce convincing arguments in defence of your position and against ours. We have produced our arguments; now produce yours. Let us debate the matter on the basis of substance and reasoned arguments without referring to some sort of tone. But if you are going to take digs at us, so to speak, we shall, of course, take digs at you. That is the usual result of polemics. It cannot be helped.

But I think that I did all this quite politely and tactfully without indulging in any rudeness. If I have sometimes indulged in jokes, you too have indulged in them. I have not taken umbrage on that account. So let us wipe this question completely off the agenda. It does not figure on the agenda. Let us get down to a really businesslike presentation of arguments. Let us have your arguments in defence of your position and against ours. Prove that the Soviet Union will have an advantage when it proposes a 100 per cent elimination of the means of delivery and when at the same time it proposes the reduction of its armed forces to 1,700,000 men and the simultaneous elimination of foreign bases. Prove it. Then we shall see. Otherwise, defending your position without adducing any arguments and by merely referring to tone is unconvincing.

That is all I have to say at present. I shall leave an analysis of the reasons which you have given and of some other points which you have tried to defend until we have a serious and businesslike discussion in the future.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): As representative of the United Kingdom, I shall detain members only one more moment to say that it occurs to me that whatever may have changed in the tone of the debate, one thing remains constant -- that our Soviet colleague still likes to have the last word.

Does any other member wish to address the Conference?

Mr. LALL (India): Perhaps this might ensure that the Soviet representative shall not have the last word! I am intervening merely to say that I am glad that this question of tone was raised, and I am very glad that it seems to have been cleared up. I feel it has largely been cleared up. Mr. Zorin has assured us that there has been no change in his tone. I have not really detected any great changes in tone, but perhaps the Chairman has a much more sensitive ear than I have. Nevertheless, I do seriously want to say that I am glad that this issue has been cleared up. It would be unfortunate if we became involved in a feeling that either side was really not keen to go ahead with the substance of our task and was using polemics in debate rather than argument. We are grateful that this is not the case.

The other point which I want to mention and which has been cleared up to a great extent today is the question of verification in connexion with the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage.

I understood Mr. Zorin to say that the Soviet proposal for controls is 100 per cent verification on the whole territory of the Soviet Union in connexion with this particular measure. I think that answers one of the important points raised by Mr. Burns. If it does not, I would like to hear from Mr. Burns, or from someone else, precisely why and how it does not. I think this is an important issue. It does clarify a very important point, and because it clarifies an important point I think it will help us to proceed further in our substantive consideration of disarmament -- and not only of this issue; for obviously, if this statement holds good for the delivery vehicles analogous statements will hold good for the other elements of disarmament and the controls proposed in that plan.

I am not now going to argue whether or not the plan is balanced or whether either plan is balanced. But I do agree with our colleague from Nigeria -- I said this myself very briefly yesterday -- that a balanced plan may well have in each stage varying reductions of percentages, quantitative reductions and also perhaps

(Mr. Lall, India)

eliminations. I do not at all hold the view that a percentage plan across the board is necessarily more balanced than a mixed plan which, by its mixture, achieves a balance. Indeed, I would like to express the view that any plan which succeeds would have to be a mixed plan. The straight line percentage method has been tried before; it has failed; and there is no point in going back to positions which have failed. I think we must have a flexibility of approach in this matter. That is what Mr. Atta has said, and we entirely agree with that view. Unless there is some flexibility on both sides in dealing with this issue, and in particular in adjusting disarmament measures, we are not going to get any further. It is the concern of all of us that there should be this mutual adjustment.

I would in a very friendly way make this appeal to both sides. We have heard the defence of their plans. We hope that they are now on the verge of saying to each other, and saying to the Conference, that they are willing to adjust to some extent to each other's plans. There is no point in our hearing further justifications of plan A and of plan B. We know the justifications. But the process of adjustment must start now, and we very much hope that we are on the verge of starting it.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirty-first meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. J.B. Godber, Minister of State and representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Nigeria, Czechoslovakia, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 7 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

